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Law, Economics, and Politics:
The Untold History of the Due Process
Limitation on Punitive Damages
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1991 case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, the Supreme Court held that punitive damage awards
may be constrained by the Due Process clause.' This decision
spawned several sequels, all of which have been characterized as
bad constitutional interpretation. 2 Commentators have critiqued
these opinions' tenuous connection to the text of the Constitution
and their disregard for federalism. 3 Furthermore, prior to Haslip,
* LL.M, Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Roger Williams University
School of Law. Thank you to Professors Jared Goldstein and Carl Bogus for
their editing suggestions and advice. Thanks also to Thelma Dzialo for her
research assistance and to Robert Morton-Ranney for sharing his insights
into twentieth-century culture.
1. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
2. See, e.g., Jim Davis, BMW v. Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S.
Supreme Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large
Punitive Damage Awards, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 395 (1998); Michelle J. Carey,
Note, BMW of America v. Gore, A Misplaced Guide for Punitive Damage
Awards, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 219 (1997); Glen R. Whitehead, Note, BMW of
North America v. Gore: Is the Supreme Court Initiating Judicial Tort
Reform?, 16 Quinnipiac L. REV. 533 (1997). Some scholarship has endorsed
the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, usually applauding the
decision as good policy. See, e.g., Thomas H. Dupree Jr., Punitive Damages
and the Constitution, 70 LA. L. REV. 421 (2010).
3. See Davis, supra note 2, at 396; Carey, supra note 2, at 236-38. But
see Christine D'Ambrosia, Comment, Punitive Damages in Light of BMW of
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the argument had been roundly rejected by all courts to consider
the issue. So why did the decision come out the way it did? I
contend that the argument won acceptance due to a cultural shift,
observed by scholar Mark A. Smith, which began in the 1970s: a
move towards evaluating social policies based solely on their
adherence to free-market ideology. 4 In the face of economic
disruptions during the 1970s, conservative and Republican
policymakers relied heavily on free-market economic arguments. 5
According to these arguments, any policies that reduce corporate
profits-including punitive damages-are impediments to the
nation's economic well-being. A majority of the Supreme Court,
persuaded by the reasoning long urged by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, agreed in the Haslip case.
In this article, I argue that the Supreme Court's series of
punitive damage cases was wholly motivated by these
contemporary political considerations. The restrictions imposed
by the Court were justified through reference to the Due Process
Clause; specifically, that juror discretion was so broad that
judicial enforcement of punitive damage
awards was
6
unconstitutionally arbitrary. This, however, was a subterfuge.
Nothing had changed in punitive damages practice or procedure in
centuries. The only thing that had changed was the fact that
awards had grown in size and amount and were increasingly
assessed against corporate wrongdoers.

There is no theoretical

reason that this should affect the constitutionality of punitive
damages. But, in the midst of a conservative assault on punitive
damages, shielding corporate wrongdoers was a defensible
position for jurists of the 1970s and 80s.
I provide a brief history and overview of the doctrine of

North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Cry for State Sovereignty, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 577,
578-79 (1997).
4. MARK A. SMITH, THE RIGHT TALK: How CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED
THE GREAT SOCIETY INTO THE EcoNOMIC SOCIETY 11-15 (2007).
5. Id. at 110-30. For discussion of economic arguments by conservative
intellectuals, see id. at 110-22; for those made by Republican politicians, see
id. at 123-30.

6.

Due to these vague standards, the Constitutional defect can be

framed as a problem of notice. If the standards employed by courts are vague
and arbitrary, civil defendants cannot receive meaningful notice as to what
the consequences of their acts will be. See infra note 45 and accompanying
text.

2012]

LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

793

punitive damages in Part II. In Part III, I examine attacks on
punitive damages from the nineteenth century to the present,
paying particular attention to the shift that took place in the
1970s. Part IV is devoted to an analysis of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding the Due Process limitation on punitive
damages. I offer a brief conclusion in Part V.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. The Doctrine
All damages, including punitive damages, are monetary sums
awarded to litigants as the result of a decision by a judge or jury.
However, the unique feature of punitive damages is that they are
not intended to compensate the party who has suffered an
injury-instead, they are intended to punish and to deter
wrongdoers from similar conduct in the future. 7 Typically, this
portion of the award will be directed to the plaintiff, although
some states have passed legislation mandating that a portion of
the award go to a state fund.
Punitive damages originally served three significant
purposes. First, they allowed juries to award remedies for harms
not compensable at common law, such as mental anguish and
wounded dignity.9
Second, they allowed jurors to punish
wrongdoers by assessing financial penalties for harmful conduct
that caused little or no physical damage.' 0 Finally, they served to
deter particular parties and, hopefully, other potential
wrongdoers." Over time, as courts allowed plaintiffs to recover
damages for mental anguish and other intangible harms, the
7. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008)
("[T]he consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.").
8. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0206) (2008) ("If a person receives an
award of punitive damages, the court shall require that 50 percent of the
award be deposited into the general fund of the state."); IOWA CODE ANN. §
668A.1 (1998) ("[A]n amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of the punitive
or exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to the claimant, with
the remainder of the award to be ordered paid into a civil reparations trust
fund administered by the state court administrator.").
9.

2010).
10.
11.

LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Id. § 1.3(B).
Id. § 1.3(E).

§§

1.3(C),

1.3(D) (6th ed.
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importance of the first goal decreased. 12 But the latter two
goals-punishment and deterrence-remain relevant today.
Only the worst of the worst conduct will subject a defendant
to a claim for punitive damages. Generally, a defendant's conduct
must satisfy two requirements: it must have been intentional, and
it must have been reprehensible.1 3 Courts often phrase this
requirement using a string of colorful adverbs. For example,
Hawaii's sample jury instructions inform jurors that: "[y]ou may
award punitive damages ... only if ... the particular defendant
acted intentionally, willfully, wantonly, oppressively or with gross
negligence."1 4 These instructions reinforce the message that
punitive damages are not to be awarded lightly.
In awarding punitive damages, courts and juries are often
invited to consider a number of factors. In Haslip, the Supreme
Court cited with approval several factors considered by the
Alabama Supreme Court in reviewing jury awards of punitive
damages. While these particular factors were to be considered
after trial, they are the same factors judges often instruct juries to
consider before issuing an award of punitive damages. The factors
included:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm [inflicted] ... ;

(b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct ... ; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct . .. ; (d) the "financial position" of the

defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation .... .
Depending on the jurisdiction, jurors may be invited to consider
some or all of these factors in determining whether to award
punitive damages.
B. The Origin of Punitive Damages
There is a tradition of forcing wrongdoers to pay money as a
form of punishment in Anglo-American jurisprudence dating back

12. Id. § 1.4(B).
13. Id. § 4.2(A)(2).
14. Hawai'i Standard Civil Jury Instructions,Instruction No. 8.12, Sup.
CT. HAW. (Oct. 11, 1999), http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/legal-references/
jury-instructions-civil.pdf.
15.
Pac. Mutual Life. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).

2012]

LAW, ECONOMICS,AND POLITICS

795

to the thirteenth century. 16 The modern doctrine of punitive
damages, however, dates back to a pair of English cases from 1763
that involved John Wilkes, a colorful seventeenth-century Member
of Parliament and a stalwart advocate of a free press.' 7 Wilkes
disliked King George III and had particular animosity towards
John Stuart Bute, the King's trusted minister.
He fiercely
attacked both officials in print. George III retaliated by waging a
battle against Wilkes and his printing press. The ensuing events
made Wilkes a hero to many eighteenth-century Britons and
Americans.18
An essay Wilkes authored in The North Briton number fortyfive infuriated King George so much that that he promptly issued
a warrant for Wilkes's arrest. 19
This retaliatory decision,
however, was made against the King's better instincts. Because
Wilkes was a Member of Parliament, it was fairly clear that his
editorial was privileged under English law. 20 The Crown officials
proceeded anyway. Not knowing the identity of the publishers,
the Crown engaged in an overbroad search and arrested forty-nine
individuals in its search for three publishers. 2 1 Wilkes was
eventually discovered and arrested.2 2 Soon after, the officials
pillaged Wilkes's house, gathering as many of his papers and
writings as they could in the hopes of finding something
incriminating. 23
Wilkes and others decided to challenge the assaults on their
homes and property. At least forty cases were filed relating to the

16.
17.

SCHLUETER, supra note 9, § 1.3(A).
For more on Wilkes, see ARTHUR

H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE

SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY (2006).

18. Id. at 1-2. Wilkes was so famous on this side of the Atlantic that two
towns-Wilkesboro, North Carolina and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania-were
named after him. Id. at 2.
19. Id. Specifically, Wilkes blasted the government for various abuses it
had allegedly committed. Id. at 100. He predicted public resistance to the
government's oppressive acts: "[A] spirit of liberty ought ... to arise, and I
am sure ever will, in proportion to the weight of the grievance [we] feel." Id.
20. Id. at 101. Also, his arrest was effectuated by use of a general
warrant, the offensive device that would later inspire the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See id.
21. Id. at 105.
22. Id. at 107.
23. Id. at 109.
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North Briton search.2 4 The English judiciary responded by
holding the government accountable for its unnecessarily
expansive search. Large jury awards were upheld in two cases,
Huckle v. Money and Wilkes v. Wood. These cases marked the
birth of the modern doctrine of punitive damages. In Huckle v.
Money, a wrongfully arrested printer (Huckle) sued the Crown
official for trespass and false imprisonment. 25 This was in spite of
the fact that, after his arrest, Huckle was confined for only six
hours and was treated quite well.26 At most, Huckle suffered £20
in damages, but an outraged jury awarded him £300.27 Denying a
motion for a new trial, Lord Camden of the Court of Common
Pleas upheld the jury's verdict, commenting that: "[I] think [the
jury] ha[s] done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a
man's home by virtue of a name-less warrant in order to procure
evidence is worse than the Spanish Inquisition, a law under which
no English-man would wish to live an hour."2 8
Wilkes's own challenge to the wrongful search and seizure of
his effects was also successful. He sued Undersecretary Robert
Wood for his role in the affair and was awarded the whopping sum
of £1000.29 Lord Chief Justice Pratt affirmed the jury's award,
refusing to limit Wilkes' recovery to the nominal damage incurred
by the trespass. 30 Lord Chief Justice Pratt opined that "[d]amages
are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but
likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the
jury to the action itself."3 By allowing Wilkes to recover well in
24. Id. at 133.
25. SCHLUETER, supra note 9, § 1.3(A); see also CASH, supra note 17, at
132-33.
26. SCHLUETER, supra note 9, § 1.3(A).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. CASH, supra note 17, at 160; see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H.
Koenig, Taming the Tort Master: The American Civil Justice System as a
Background of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 56 (2002). Based on an
online calculator developed by Professor Eric Nye at the University of
Wyoming, £1000 in 1773 is equal to $136,357.89 in 2009 U.S. dollars. See
Eric Nye, Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, U.
WYo., http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edulnumimage/currency.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2012).
30. Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury
Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 79, 81 (2005).
31.
Leah R. Mervine, Comment, Bridging the "PhilosophicalVoid" in
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excess of his actual damage, Wilkes's jury and Chief Justice Pratt
sent a message to the Crown: outrageous behavior will be
punished even if the physical damage caused is negligible.
C. The Growing Acceptance of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages were imported into the American colonies
and quickly became a fixture of American jurisprudence. Indeed,
Wilkes was lauded as a heroic defender of liberty in revolutionary
America. 32 The practice was not uncontroversial, and some states
refused to award punitive damages under any circumstances. But
these states were a minority, and punitive damages were a widely
accepted remedy by the mid-nineteenth century. In an 1852
opinion, the United States Supreme Court declared that "if
repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be
received as the best exposition of what the law is, the question [of
the validity of punitive damages] will not admit of argument." 33
More than 150 years later, punitive damages are still available to
litigants. However, they have increasingly admitted of argument
and have become subject to Constitutional restraints. 34
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE DUE PROCESS LIMITATION ARGUMENT
A. The Historical Debate Over Punitive Damages
Though punitive damages achieved acceptance in American
jurisprudence, they have always faced criticism from a small but
determined minority. Early critics offered a formalistic critique.35
They argued that damages in civil actions must compensate for
the harm inflicted, no more and no less. Damages awarded as
punishment or for additional compensation violated the order and
symmetry of the law. 36
Punitive Damages: Empowering Plaintiffs and Society Through Punitive
Damages, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1587, 1599 (2007) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
32. CASH, supra note 17, at 265 (noting that "Wilkes and Liberty" had
become a "battle cry in America").
33. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1173 (1931).
36. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 29, at 79-80 (2002). Professor
Simon Greenleaf, author of an influential treatise on evidence, was perhaps
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These critiques could be quite forceful. Perhaps the most
vociferous example came from Judge Foster of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in 1872." Reviewing an award of
actual and punitive damages in a case of assault and battery,
Foster delivered a "very lengthy"3 8 discussion of the doctrine of
punitive damages. He expressed outrage at the fact that courts
awarded damages in excess of actual damages, and argued that
the imposition of punitive damages would constitute double
jeopardy if a defendant was subject to criminal liability for the act
in question. In an oft-quoted passage, Foster expressed his
disgust at the doctrine of punitive damages: "What kind of a civil
remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant? The
idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an
unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the
law."39 Given this searing indictment, it is not surprising that the
court set aside the jury's punitive damages award without even
discussing the facts of the case. 40
The formalistic, policy-based argument continued well into
the twentieth century. 4 1 But while the decline of legal formalism
in the twentieth century quieted many critics, 4 2 the critics did not
disappear. They renewed their attacks in the late nineteenth
century under a new theory: the notion that punitive damages
violate the Due Process clause.
B. The Due Process Argument
1. Early Twentieth Century Challenges
Litigants have alleged for over a century that particular
punitive damages awards violate the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. Reported examples of Due Process challenges to
punitive damages awards first appeared around the turn of the
twentieth century. These arguments, however, were case specific
the most well-known advocate of this position. See id.
37. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 342-43 (N.H. 1872).
38. This (accurate) description is borrowed from the Oregon Supreme
Court. See Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 210 P.2d 461, 469 (Or. 1949).
39. Fay, 53 N.H. at 382.
40. Id. at 342-43.
41.
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 35.
42.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 546 (3d ed.
2005) (explaining the decline of formalism).
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and not the result of any general argumentative strategy.
Instead, litigants challenged punitive damages awarded under
particular statutes and causes of action. 43 These arguments
proved wholly unsuccessful.4 4
The precise nature of the Due Process argument is difficult to
nail down. However, the version adopted by the Supreme Court
appears to be that the Due Process Clause's notice requirement
renders punitive damage verdicts void.4 5
According to this
argument, defendants who may be found liable for punitive
damages cannot predict whether their intentional or grossly
negligent behavior would result in a punitive damages award and,
if so, how much would be assessed.
Corporations were the first and most frequent challengers of
punitive damage verdicts.
For example, railroad companies
challenged the excessiveness of punitive awards assessed under
the doctrine of vicarious liability. 4 6 Also, insurance companies
sought to invalidate statutes that permitted awards of punitive
damages against insurers who in bad faith refused to settle
claims. 4 7 Courts were unsympathetic to these arguments. 4 8 They
summarily dismissed these claims, deferring to judicial precedent
43. See, e.g., Niebyski v. Welcome, 108 A. 341, 343 (Vt. 1919)
(challenging a plaintiffs ability to recover punitive damages for rape).
44. See, e.g., U.S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Sullivan, 3 F.2d 794,
795-96 (5th Cir. 1925); Riser v. S. Ry. Co., 46 S.E. 47, 51 (S.C. 1903). I have
deliberately excluded those jurisdictions that never recognized punitive
damages in the first instance. See, e.g., Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., 177 N.W. 156, 157 (Neb. 1920) ("A statute which takes property
from one individual and gives it to another, not in compensation for any
injury sustained, is contrary to the provisions of the [Nebraska] Constitution
securing property rights of private individuals.").
45. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-88 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
46. See Hull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 57 S.E. 28, 29 (S.C. 1907); Reeves
v. Southern Ry., 46 S.E. 543, 545 (S.C. 1904) ("Is a master liable in punitive
damages for the willful tort of a servant? This principle has been settled so
long and recognized so often in this state . .. that we do not deem it necessary
to add any authorities to those cited .... .").
47. See, e.g., Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Lovelace, 58 S.E. 93 (Ga. App.
1907) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute as it
was previously upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court); Barber v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., 187 S.W. 867, 870 (Mo. 1916) (refusing to entertain a due process
argument due to repeated rejection of the argument by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Missouri Supreme Court).
48. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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or legislative authority. 49
2. The 1960s: Opening Shots
Arguments against punitive damages emerged again with
newfound vigor in the 1960s. Critics, including judges and
commentators, assailed the theoretical basis of the doctrine and
issued a renewed attack on punitive damages under the Due
Process Clause. Significantly, these attacks expressed no opinion
on the effect of punitive damage awards on the American
economy. They also proved unpersuasive to courts, who continued
to award punitive damages.
Two publications from 1965 are representative of this era of
punitive damage criticism: one a judicial dissent, the other a
scholarly article. The judicial dissent came from Judge Richard
Rives of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts.50 Rives was a member of the so-called
"Fifth Circuit Four," a group of Southern judges who bravely and
consistently waged a judicial battle against Southern segregation
following Brown v. Board of Education.5 1 Judge Rives was
appalled by Southern States' treatment of and lack of concern for
African-Americans. 5 2 Perhaps it was this distaste for stateimposed or state-condoned punishment that informed Judge Rives'
beliefs about punitive damages.
In Butts, a majority of the Fifth Circuit upheld a punitive
damages award of $400,000 for the publication of a defamatory
article. The Court reasoned that although the award was quite
large, the jury had acted properly and the award was otherwise in
accordance with Georgia law. 53
Judge Rives vehemently
disagreed. He voiced several objections to the award, including
several constitutional ones. Looking back, his dissent reads like a
preview of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance v. Haslip.
First, Judge Rives assessed the validity of the award by

49.

Id.

50.
51.

351 F.2d 702, 726-33 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, J., dissenting).
See Anne S. Emanuel, Forming the Historic Fifth Circuit: The
Eisenhower Years, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 233, 245-46, 258-59 (2002).
52.
53.

Id. at 236-242.
Butts, 351 F.2d at 717-18.
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comparing it to legislative sanctions for similar conduct.5 4 The
maximum fine for criminal libel in Georgia's was $1000. Rives
then compared this amount with the punitive award using a
mathematical ratio.55 This produced a large disparity: the ratio
between the fine and the reduced amount on appeal was 400-to-1
and the ratio between the fine and the jury's original award was
3000-to-1. 56 He also argued that because the punitive damages
resembled a criminal fine, defendant Curtis Publishing should
have received criminal constitutional protections.57
Second, he made the argument that the punitive award was
void because there was no "definite standard or controlling guide
to govern the award."58 The standards given to the jury were
"vague" and "arbitrary" and, thus, the jury could not possibly
produce a verdict that was the result of a rational process. 59
Implicit in this argument is the idea that due process prohibits the
government from acting irrationally. Though Judge Rives claimed
that his discussion was limited to the case at hand, it could be
easily applied to future cases since the procedures employed by
the trial court in that case were typical of those used in Georgia
and throughout the country. 60
Professor James D. Ghiardi, then Research Director for the
Defense Research Institute (DRI), echoed Judge Rives' sentiments
in an article written for the American Bar Association's Section of
Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law. 6 1 The Defense
Research Institute was founded in 1960 to protect the interests of
the defense bar, a group consisting largely of corporations and

54. Id. at 726 (Rives, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Rives, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Rives, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 727-28 (Rives, J., dissenting). These safeguards include proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the rights of a criminal indictment and
confrontation, and the rights against self-incrimination and double jeopardy.
58. Id. at 728-29 (Rives, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 729 (Rives, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 727 (Rives, J., dissenting).
61. For more information regarding Professor Ghiardi, see Faculty and
Staff Directory: James D. Ghiardi, MARQ. U. L. SCH., http://law.marquette.
edulfaculty-and-staff-directory/detail/2010874 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); see
also DAVIDSON REAm, A HISTORY OF DRI: SERVING THE DEFENSE BAR (2005),

available at http://www.dri.org/ContentDirectory/Public/About/DRI-History
2005.pdf.

802 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:791
insurance companies. 62 The article was titled Should Punitive
Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative. 63 The
article lambasted punitive damages, echoing the criticisms voiced
by Judge Foster almost a century ago. 64 In particular, Ghiardi
railed against plaintiffs and their lawyers, the latter of whom
were perpetually unable to "satisfy the[ir] insatiable appetite
for . .. larger and larger. . . verdict[s] . . . ."65 Like Judge Foster of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Ghiardi's constitutional
objection to the doctrine was that punitive damages awarded in a
civil suit could constitute double jeopardy if the defendant was
also subject to criminal liability. 6 6
Despite the arguments of Judge Rives, Ghiardi, and others,
there was no widespread change in punitive damages practice.
This occurred a decade later when several cultural factors
converged to convince many Americans that punitive damages
were a threat to economic stability.
3. The 1970s: The Economic Revolution
Scholar Mark A. Smith has persuasively argued that various
economic disruptions of the 1970s, including the oil embargo and
stagflation, 6 7 produced widespread economic insecurity. 68 This
insecurity persists to the present day. 69 Surveys of Americans
from 1973 to the present reveal that Americans generally have
pessimistic predictions for the American economy 70 and their
62.

REAM, supra note 61, at 1-3.

63.

James D. Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A
Statement for the Affirmative, A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 282
(1965).
64. Ghiardi explicitly cited Judge Foster's infamous comment with
approval. See id. at 282.
65. Id. at 290.
66. Id. at 287-88. The Defense Research Institute officially weighed in
on the issue of punitive damages in a 1969 monograph titled The Case
Against Punitive Damages. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE
AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (1969).

67.

For an interesting and concise description of the oil embargo and the

resulting economic disruption, see KENNETH C. DAVIS, DON'T KNow MUCH
ABOUT HISTORY 506-9 (2003).

68.

SMITH, supra note 4, at 17.

69.

See id.

70. Id. at 51-60. Specifically, Americans were decidedly negative about
the national economy from 1973 until 1983. There was an increase in
optimism in the 1990s, but this proved fleeting as predictions became gloomy
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personal futures. 7 '
Conservatives and Republicans picked up on these trends and
began to advocate for policies that spoke to this insecurity. 72
Increasingly, the justifications offered for conservative policies
became economic ones. 7 3 There are numerous theories about how
to best promote economic growth, but conservatives and
Republicans grew to rely mostly on laissez faire economic
arguments. 74 There are two reasons for this. First, conservatives
and Republicans endeavored to distinguish their beliefs from the
dominant Keynesian form of economics. Second, many of the
important figures in the conservative movement-most notably
William F. Buckley, Jr.-were libertarians who opposed any and
all government regulation of private industry. 75 Libertarian
theory is not necessarily consistent with pro-business ideology;
however, the two beliefs coalesced comfortably in the minds of
many conservatives.
Additionally, private industry looked appealing in the wake of
government failure and scandal during the 1960s and 70s. 76 After
all, executive branch officials had been responsible for Watergate,
and the executive and legislative branches teamed up to wage the
disastrous war in Vietnam. Additionally, the failure of President
Lyndon Johnson's well-intentioned but flawed Great Society

again around the year 2000. See id. at 51-52.
71. Id. at 53.
72. See id. at 15; see also id. chapters five (conservatives) and six
(Republicans).
73. Id. at 14-15.
74. Id. at 110-12. Smith notes that conservatives made free-market
arguments decades earlier; however, these were cast in terms of promoting
freedom. In the 1970s, the rationale for these arguments shifted to economic
productivity. Id. at 110-19.
75. Ellen Byers, Corporations, Contracts, and the Misguiding
Contradictions of Conservatism, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 921, 936-7 (2004)
("The first identifiable group of conservatives to emerge post-war consisted of
a new breed of classical liberals who endeavored to steer America's political
development away from government intervention and back toward[s] . . .
individualism . . .

[These included] the young William F. Buckley, Jr.").

Buckley himself did not eschew the label. One of his many books is titled
Happy Days Were Here Again: Reflections of a LibertarianJournalist(1993).
76.
See PATRICK ALLITT, THE CONSERVATIVES: IDEAS & PERSONALITIES
THROUGHOUT AMERICAN HISTORY 211 (2009); Mich. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc'y,

Placek v. Sterling Heights, Civil Wrongs and the Rights Revolution, 88 MICH.
B. J. Mar. 2009, at 6, 10.
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programs suggested that the government was incapable of solving
social problems. All of this contributed to the perception that, in
Jimmy Carter's famous phrase, the country was suffering from a
"crisis of confidence."7 7 A renewed commitment to domestic
industry appeared to be a cure.
In arguing that they were for economic security, conservatives
and Republicans implied that liberals and Democrats were not. It
was a successful strategy.
Conservative anti-governmental
attitudes thought discredited by the "scale and scope" of the Great
Depression suddenly enjoyed renewed legitimacy. 78
These
arguments were disseminated through a network of journals and
think tanks created in the 1970s and 80s. Corporations and
industry lobbying groups such as the Defense Research Institute,
beneficiaries of these policies, also joined the fray. 79
The number of conservative journals doubled from 1950 to
1980.80 This success may fairly be attributed to the popularity of
William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review. 8 ' Founded in 1954,
National Review revolutionized the field with its talented staff
including Buckley, Russell Kirk, and Frank Meyer. National
Review was a perennial foe of governmental regulation of the
economy, but it increasingly resorted to free market arguments to
make its case starting in the 1970s. 82
Another product of the 1970s was the partisan think tank, a
conservative invention. 83 Before the 1970s, think tanks did not
expressly commit themselves to any particular ideological or
political goal. 84 This changed with a self-conscious effort by
conservatives to produce research that affirmed the wisdom of free

77. The phrase was used by Jimmy Carter in a Presidential address
delivered on July 15, 1979. "Crisis of Confidence" Speech (July 15, 1979),
MILLER CTR. PUB. AFF. U. VA., http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/
speeches/detail/3402 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (providing a video and
transcript of the speech).
78. SMITH, supra note 4, at 81 ("The scale and scope of the Depression
had undermined the belief that government should stay out of the
economy.").
79. Id. at 73-94.
80. Id. at 85, Figure 4.1.
81. Id. at 83.
82.
See id. at 107-10.
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id. at 86-87.
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market economics.85 Thus were born the Heritage Foundation in
1973, the Cato Institute in 1977, and the Manhattan Institute
(originally the International Center for Economic Policy Studies)
in 1978.86 A central goal of each of these think tanks was, and is,
These
the promotion of free market economic policies.8 7
organizations have exerted significant influence on policy
makers. 88
Many businesses and industry groups threw their support
behind conservative think tanks.8 9 They also pressed their usual
arguments against governmental regulation and the imposition of
legal liability, which were favorably received in the free market
climate of the 1970s and 80s. One such group was the United
States Chamber of Commerce. 90 In a report composed for the
organization's thirtieth anniversary in 2007, the litigation arm of
the Chamber of Commerce boasted of filing amicus curiae briefs in
every Supreme Court case involving constitutional challenges to
punitive damages. 9 '
The growing free market movement reached its apex with the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan welcomed many probusiness figures into his inner circle such as William J. Casey,
founder of the Washington Legal Foundation-yet another
conservative think tank. 9 2 Reagan was a reader of National
85. See id. at 86-87.
86. Id. at 89.
87. See About, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/About/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("[Our] mission is to formulate and promote
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong
national defense."); Cato's Mission, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/aboutmission.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("The mission of the Cato Institute is
to increase the understanding of public policies based on the principles of
limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace.");
MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL'Y RESEARCH, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (a banner on the home page reads: "The mission of
the Manhattan Institute is to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster
greater economic choice and individual responsibility").
88. SMITH, supranote 4, at 91-92.
89. Id. at 90.
90. See generally About the U.S. Chamber of Com.,U.S. CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.uschamber.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
91.

NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, 30TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT

11 (2007).
92. JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 180 (2004). Casey was appointed director of the
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Review and a stalwart opponent of government regulation.
4. The Free Market Revolution in the Legal Community
Free market principles were also gaining strength in
American law schools. The Federalist Society, a conservative
legal organization, was founded just two years after Reagan's
election in 1982.93 Although the organization includes both
"conservatives and libertarians," 94 the tenor of the organization is
decidedly libertarian. 95 But perhaps no development captures the
growth of free market ideology like the law and economics
movement of the 1970s. 96 The movement seeks to explain law in
economic terms and advocates for legal policies that best promote
economic efficiency. Economic efficiency, however, is code for
unregulated free market economics. 97 These policies obviously
benefit large businesses, which have and continue to offer
financial support to law and economics programs across the
*
98
nation.

-Against this conservative backdrop, the tone of legal
scholarship discussing punitive damages changed. 99
The
CIA by Reagan. He was also the head of Reagan's election campaign. Id.
93. Our
Background,
FEDERALIST
Soc'Y
http://www.fedsoc.org/aboutuslid.28/default.asp (last visited Feb 24, 2012).

94.

Id.

95. The Federalist Society's "Conservative & Libertarian Pre-Law
Reading List" is revealing in this regard.
It organizes reading
recommendations for pre-law students into seven categories. The first is
"Law 101," followed by "Economics 101" and "Law and Economics." Section
two begins with the bold statement that: "[t]o gain a fuller understanding of
the law, a student should seek to understand basic microeconomics." Also
recommended to pre-law students are the websites of the Cato Institute and
Heritage Foundation. See Conservative & LibertarianPre-Law Reading List,
FEDERALIST Soc'Y http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.65/default.asp
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
96. Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late
Capitalism: A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and
Economics, 55 HASTINGS L J. 931, 945 (2004).
97. See id. at 945-46 ("Law and Economics ... serve[s] to 'legitimate and
justify the newly emergent forms of domination' of late capitalism . . . . [I]t
does so. . . by contributing to the hegemony of neo-Liberal ideology such that
pro-corporate capitalist outcomes come to appear universal, rather than
particular, and as common sense, rather than contested." (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
98. See id. at 948-49.
99. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on The
Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986); David
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immediate impetus for this was the products liability revolution of
the 1960s. Punitive awards in products liability cases produced
large, visible sanctions against manufacturers.10 0 These multimillion dollar awards undoubtedly dipped into corporate budgets,
but they were not being assessed haphazardly. In order to recover
punitive damages, plaintiffs had to prove that a manufacturer
engaged in conscious wrongdoing in the design or manufacturing
of a product. 0 1 Thus, punitive awards were imposed on those
companies that made deliberate choices to sacrifice safety features
in order to save money.
This fact went unrecognized in much of the scholarly
literature. Commentators ignored that corporate defendants were
being punished for intentional decisions that proved unpalatable
to juries. David G. Owen, who endorsed the wisdom of awarding
punitive damages in products liability litigation in 1976, had
changed his mind just six years later. 102 Writing in the Chicago
Law Review in 1982, he declared that: "[T]he increasing number
and size of [punitive damages] awards may fairly raise concern for
the future stability of American industry."l 03
Other legal
commentators were equally if not more dramatic. James B. Sales
and Kenneth B. Cole Jr., writing in a 1984 article entitled
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, opined

that "theoretical arguments mask the archaic and destructive
nature of the punitive damages doctrine" 04 and that
"[r]esponsible jurisprudence ...
argues forcefully in favor of
relegating this legal dinosaur to an era that long since has
G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982); James B. Sales & Kenneth
B. Cole Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1984). See also Jewell Hargleroad, Punitive
Damages: The Burden of Proof Required by ProceduralDue Process, 22 U.S.F.
L. REV. 99, 99 n.1 (1987). For additional commentary sounding the punitive
damages alarm, see Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L.
REV. 1, 2 (1992).
100. See Owen, supranote 99, at 3-4.
101.
This remains the case today. See Mark S. Dennison & Warren
Freedman, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 54 AM. JUR.
TRIALs 443, § 1 (1995).
102. Owen, supra note 99, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Sales & Cole, supra note 99, at 1118.
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passed." 0 5
Even acclaimed scholar John Calvin Jeffries got swept up in
the anti-punitive damages fervor. In an article devoted to a
discussion of the constitutionality of punitive awards, he offered
his analysis of the American tort system.106 His position relied on
dubious logical and causal assumptions. First, he argued, as
evidenced by "the newspapers," the "American civil liability
system [was] approaching a crisis." 0 7 Next, he declared that
punitive damages were a "prominent aspect" of the crisis.os This
led him to conclude that punitive damages were "out of control." 09
Professor Jeffries assertions were not supported by citations,
and nor could they have been. The basis of critics' complaints was
that punitive damages were "out of control." But "out of control" is
merely a subjective complaint that does not explain anything.
What Professor Jeffries and other critics meant to say was that
punitive verdicts were increasing in size and amount. And this
was true: tort verdicts, which often included punitive damages,
were on the rise. 110 In a startling and likely representative
statistic, tort awards in Cook County, Illinois went from $52,000
in 1960 to $1.2 million in 1984.111 Many saw this as a burden on
manufacturers, who, in turn, burdened the public by raising prices
on goods and services to compensate for litigation costs. 112
Whatever the validity of this argument, it is indefensible as
applied to punitive damages awards. A punitive damages award
means that a company committed an intentional or grossly
negligent act. The American tort system allows people and
corporations to engage in such activity but, if they choose to, they
must pay for making such decisions.
However, free market arguments enjoyed such legitimacy that
defendants who intentionally produced unsafe products were
portrayed as victims.
This argument would have been
105.

Id. at 1119.

106.

Jeffries, supra note 99, passim.

107.
108.
109.

Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.

110.

See Mich. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc'y, supra note 76, at 10.

111.

See id.

112.

See id. ("One West Virginia Supreme Court justice opined, 'Much of

my time is devoted to ways to make business pay for everyone else's bad
luck."' (citation omitted)).
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unfathomable in the wake of World War II, but it gained traction
in a climate hospitable to anti-regulatory, pro-corporation
sentiments. The stage was thus set to renew constitutional
attacks on punitive damages, and attorneys for the Aetna Life
Insurance Company got the chance to do so before the Supreme
Court in 1986.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Introduction
The issue of the constitutionality of punitive damages first
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 and was dismissed. But,
as the years went on, the theory quickly gained adherents. The
speed with which anti-punitive damages sentiment took hold on
the Court was incredible.
Within five years of rejecting a
constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court had reversed course
and held that punitive damages were constrained by the Due
Process Clause.113
We may never know what conversations the Supreme Court
Justices had on this issue, and we will certainly never know what
went through their minds. However, an educated guess can be
made based on the Justices' written opinions and personalities.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court's most vocal critic of
punitive damages, appears to have been the driving force behind
the punitive damage limitation.1 14 Her opinions read much like
the legal literature of the time, emphasizing that punitive
damages were large, out of control, and to blame for the country's
economic decline.115
While Justice O'Connor's distaste for large punitive damage
awards was surely influenced by the negative press afforded
punitive damages in the 1970s and 80s, the roots of her aversion
are deeper.11 6 O'Connor was influenced by the views of her father,
113. Compare Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) with Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
114. Patrick H. Foley, Note, Oil and Water: How the Polluted Wake of the
Exxon Valdez Has Endangeredthe Essence of Punitive Damages, 43 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 475, 493-95 (2010).
115. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116.
See JOAN BIsKUPic, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN
ON THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 13-14 (2006).
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a firm believer in individualism. He rejected any and all reliance
on others, including the government. He especially despised
President Roosevelt's New Deal, even though New Deal policies
had helped keep his ranch in business." 7 Punitive damages do
not fare well according to this view. Depending on the judiciary to
award and enforce punitive damages violates principles of selfreliance, while having to pay for more damage than one caused
runs counter to strong feelings of self-responsibility. Judging from
her opinions in punitive damage cases, it appears that Justice
O'Connor may have internalized her father's sentiments.
Justice O'Connor was also well known for ensuring that her
opinions became the opinions of the Court1 18 and, when this could
not be accomplished, that a middle-of-the-road compromise was
reached."' 9 Justice O'Connor eventually got four members of the
Court to endorse her views on the relationship between punitive
damages and the Constitution. In a testament to how widespread
fears over punitive damages were, O'Connor did not even have to
compromise her thoughts on the issue one bit.
Of course, there are other arguments supporting a Due
Process limitation besides adherence to free market principles.
Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, like Judge
Rives, argued that punitive damages instructions were too
irrational, and produced results that were impermissibly
unpredictable.120
This concern undoubtedly motivated their
decisions. However, if this was their only concern, the proper
117. Id. at 13-14, 24.
118. See Emily Bazelon, The Swing Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006,
Section 7 at 21 ("She ... remade the court in her own image."); Jeffrey Rosen,
A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, Section 6 at 32 ("We are all
living now in Sandra Day O'Connor's America. Take almost any of the most
divisive questions of American life, and Justice O'Connor either has decided
it or is about to decide it on our behalf.").
119. Bazelon, supra note 118 ("She was always splitting the baby - by
allowing for abortion regulation while salvaging Roe; by hacking away at
defendants' rights and then voting to end execution of the mentally retarded;
by limiting the scope of affirmative action without striking down all racial
preferences; and by allowing local governments to display cr~ches at
Christmas - if they threw in Santa Claus and a menorah."); see also Dahlia
Lithwick, Robed in Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al5 ("Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence is narrow and fact-centered. Sometimes the lines
she draws are visible only to her .... ).
120. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280-81 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

2012]

LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

811

remedy would have been a requirement for more detailed jury
instructions, not a monetary ceiling on punitive awards. As we
will see, the Constitutional limitation adopted by the Court went
much further, severely limiting the amount of punitive damages
recoverable by litigants. The Justices who voted for this doctrine
must also have believed that punitive damages were out of
control.
B. Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie
The Due Process argument was first presented to the
Supreme Court in a 1986 case, Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie.121
The underlying dispute in the case involved an insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle a claim.122 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
main issue was not the merits of the case or amount of the award,
but whether the judge who authored the Alabama Supreme
Court's opinion and cast the deciding vote should have been
disqualified. 123
Aetna Life Insurance, however, also sought to attack the
amount of punitive damages assessed against the company. It
argued that the punitive damages awarded violated both the
Excessive Fines Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. In its appellate brief, Aetna argued that punitive
damages are "arbitrary, capricious, severe and whimsical." 124 The
brief included various semi-critical quotations about the nature of
punitive damages plucked from a handful of Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not entertain these
opinions. 125
arguments, but it did not firmly reject them either. The majority
suggestively noted that Aetna's arguments "raise important issues
which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved."' 26

121.

475 U.S. 813 (1986).

122.
123.

Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 815.

124. Brief of Appellant at 46, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813
(1986) (No. 84-1601).
125. See id. at 46-49. Aetna also filed a reply brief that offered similar
arguments. Reply Brief of Appellant at 14-20, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813 (1986) (No. 84-1601).

126.

Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828-29.
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C. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw
The dispute in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, like
Aetna, was over an alleged bad faith refusal to settle.127 Bankers
Life and Casualty argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that a
Mississippi statute mandating a fifteen percent penalty for parties
who unsuccessfully appealed a monetary award violated the Equal

Protection Clause.12 8 On this point, six of the seven justices who
heard the case agreed that there was no Equal Protection
violation. 129 Bankers Life also tried to stage a Due Process attack
on the punitive award on appeal.1 30 The Court refused to
entertain the claim, however, finding that it was not properly
raised below. 13 1 Justice O'Connor, writing separately, agreed that
the claim should not be entertained. However, she went out of her
way to interject her own view on the issue.132 Justice O'Connor
criticized the unpredictability of punitive damage awards, inviting
future litigants to raise the issue "in an appropriate case." 33
Though the nature of the attack differed slightly, Browning-Ferris
Industries accepted the invitation one year later.
D. Browning-FerrisIndustriesof Vermont v. Kelco Disposal
Browning-Ferris, supported by industry and tort reformers,
challenged a six million dollar punitive damages award based on
the

Excessive

Constitution. 134

Fines

The

and

Due

excessive

Process

fines

Clauses

argument

of

the

proved

unsuccessful, as seven of the nine Justices held that the clause did
not apply to a civil action where the government did not prosecute

the suit or receive the alleged fines.135 The Due Process claim was
also unsuccessful, but for a procedural reason: since the issue was
not raised in the court below, the majority refused to consider
127. See 486 U.S. 71, 73 (1988); Aetna, 475 U.S. at 815-16.
128. Bankers Life, 486 U.S..at 73.
129. Id. at 72, 85-86. Justice Blackmun argued that the Mississippi
Statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 89-93 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 76.
131. Id. at 78.
132. Id. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
133. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
134. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 259-60 (1989).
135. Id. at 263-64.
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it. 136
Although all Justices agreed that the issue of a Due Process
limitation on punitive damages had not been properly raised,
many of them had something to say about it. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, concurred with the Court on the
understanding that the Due Process issue would be reserved for
another day. 137 Justice Brennan expressed alarm at the fact that
juries impose monetary fines based on vague, amorphous judicial
instructions regarding punitive damages. 3 8
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
did Justice Brennan one better.13 9 Joined by Justice Stevens,
Justice O'Connor sharply criticized the large awards assessed
against corporate wrongdoers, arguing that "skyrocketing"
verdicts were stifling the creation of new products.140 For an issue
the Justices agreed not to decide, the Due Process argument had
nevertheless garnered considerable attention.
E. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip
Doctrinally, Haslip was a milestone in the Supreme Court's
Due Process jurisprudence. For the first time, the Court explicitly
acknowledged that the Due Process clause limits the amount of
punitive damages that may be awarded.141 However, the Court
merely gave the new doctrine lip service in applying it to the facts
at hand.
Pacific Mutual raised yet another Due Process challenge to a
punitive damages award.
The Supreme Court reached a
compromise on the issue. In defense of punitive damage awards,
the Court held that the prevailing method for determining
punitive damages was constitutional. 142 The Court noted that the
procedure had been in existence for centuries, all courts to address
the issue agreed as to its constitutionality, and that there was no
evidence that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had any

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
Id. at 17.
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concerns with punitive damages.14 3 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that "unlimited jury discretion ... in the fixing of punitive
damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities."1 44 Its support for this statement consisted of an
inapposite Supreme Court case from almost a century earlier, and
an article published by David Owen in the Alabama Law
Review.1 45
What appeared to be a radical shift in punitive damages
jurisprudence, however, was mitigated by the Court's subsequent
language and holding. The Court acknowledged that a strict Due
Process limitation on punitive damages could never be
established. Instead, the Court stated that "reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court" should suffice to keep jury
verdicts within an acceptable range. 14 6 This reduced the Court's
restrictive holding to a mere judicial slap on the wrist. The Court
seemed to be merely telling states to simply keep an eye on
punitive damages verdicts. Indeed, the Supreme Court found the
$840,000 award here eminently reasonable. 147 The Court noted
that both the jury instructions and the Alabama Supreme Court's
factors for analyzing punitive damage awards were acceptable.1 4 8
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, criticized the
majority's holding on the Due Process issue. 149 He stressed the
historical pedigree of punitive damages, and criticized the
majority for allowing their personal views on punitive damages to
warp their interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
Justice O'Connor authored a forceful dissent, elaborating
upon her statements in Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris. She
blasted the unpredictable nature of punitive damages, arguing
143. Id. at 15-18.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 18 & n.8. The cited case, Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v Texas,
involved criminal penalties assessed under anti-trust legislation. 212 U.S. 86,
96 (1909). This distinguishes it from a civil action where punitive damages
are assessed according to common law doctrine. The defendant oil company
did, however, argue that the penalties assessed against it were excessive and
violated the Due Process clause. Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 111. The
Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the penalties. Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S.
at 112.
146. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
147. See id. at 7 n.2, 24.
148. Id. at 19-24.
149. Id. at 24-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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that they had "explode[ed] in . . . frequency and size" in recent

years. 15 0 She argued that the jury instructions here were woefully
Also, she argued, the
inadequate and void for vagueness.1 5'
award violated Pacific Mutual's right to procedural due process
due to the vague instructions. 152 While Justice O'Connor may
have lost the battle, she had won the war. Punitive damages were
now subject to constitutional constraints.
F. TXO ProductionCorporationv. Alliance Resources Corporation
The TXO Production Corporation had embarked upon a
mission to prove that Alliance Resources, a company with which it
was negotiating to purchase gas rights, did not have good title to
the land involved in the transaction. 153 The problem with this
plan, however, was that it was fraudulent and pursued in bad
faith. When TXO sued Alliance over an alleged encumbrance on
its title, Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title. 154 At trial,
jurors heard evidence regarding TXO's conduct, and learned that
TXO had engaged in similar schemes throughout the country. 155
The jury responded in kind and awarded Alliance $19,000 in
actual damages (the cost of defending the suit) and ten million
dollars in punitive damages.1 56 Reduced to a ratio, Alliance
received over 500 times its actual damages in punitives.157
One might expect that the parties would once again duel over
whether the Constitution precludes excessive punitive damages
verdicts. But this issue, surprisingly, was conceded by Alliance's
counsel. 5 8 Instead the parties battled over what kind of scrutiny
Alliance
a jury-imposed punitive verdict should receive.
advocated for a mere rational basis review, while TXO argued that
such awards should be subject to heightened scrutiny.159
Specifically, TXO requested that the Court consider four factors in
determining whether a punitive damages verdict was
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 448-9 (1993).
Id. at 447, 450.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 455.
Id.
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constitutional: (1) similar awards in the same jurisdiction; (2)
similar awards in other jurisdictions; (3) laws imposing penalties
for similar conduct; and (4) the "relationship" of compensatory
damages to punitives in all similar cases. 160
A plurality of the Court rejected both parties' proposed
standards of review.161 Instead, the plurality, per Justice Stevens,
suggested that any such test would be inappropriate.1 62 The
plurality affirmed the jury's verdict, noting that although the
award was shocking, so too was TXO's conduct.163 The plurality
effectively confirmed the minimal effect of Haslip's Due Process
pronouncements. It did not even consider TXO's challenge to the
jury instructions. 6 4
The plurality, composed of four justices (three who joined in
whole, and one in part),1 65 was supported by a concurring faction
of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Scalia echoed his
argument in Haslip: the constitution does not guarantee a right
against excessive jury verdicts.166 However, he was placated by
the plurality's loose application of Haslip. He predicted that large
punitive verdicts would now be routinely affirmed by the Supreme
Court, which would simply note that the award in question was
"no worse than TXO."l 67
Justice O'Connor authored a fierce dissent. She declared that
punitive damage awards were "monstrous" thanks to the
continued operation of an "arbitrary and oppressive system."1 68
She acknowledged the importance of the jury in American
jurisprudence; however, she criticized these "ordinary citizens" as
160. Id. at 455-56. These factors were derived from Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Solem v. Helm, which involved the distinguishable
context of a criminal defendant's challenge to a sentence of life without parole
as disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. See 463 U.S. 277, 284-92
(1983).

161.
162.

TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.
See id. at 456-57.

163. Id. at 462.
164. See id. at 463-65.
165. The three members who joined the plurality opinion in whole are
Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and Blackmun. Id. at 446. Justice Kennedy
joined the plurality's opinion as to parts I and IV. Id. Writing separately,
Justice Kennedy emphasized that, although this was a close case, the jury's
verdict was justified by TXO's malicious conduct. Id. at 466-69.
166. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prone to impassioned and irrational decision making.16 9
Specifically, she spotted numerous flaws in the case under review.
First, the verdict was simply too high-twenty times higher than
the highest punitive damages award in similar West Virginia
cases. 170 Second, she argued the Court should be allowed to rely
upon only the information presented to the jury, not after-the-fact
arguments raised on appeal.171 Finally, Justice O'Connor claimed
that TXO was likely unfairly punished by the jury due to the fact
that it was an out-of-state company.172
Despite Justice O'Connor's vehement opposition towards large
punitive damages awards, she said that she did not seek to impose
strict standards on the states because "the principles of federalism
counsel against such a course." 73 But, just five years later, she
would join an opinion that did just that. 174 Even stranger, that
opinion would be written by Justice Stevens, author of the
plurality opinion in TXO. '
G. BMW of North America v. Gore
Ira Gore's plight was devoid of the usual sympathies often
associated with plaintiffs who recover punitive damages. Mr.
Gore's injury-that his allegedly new BMW had been repainted by
BMW of North America-fell far short of the wrongdoing
vindicated in Lavoie, Crenshaw or Haslip.176 This injury was
compounded when, during discovery, Gore's counsel discovered
that BMW had adopted a nationwide policy of passing off old,
damaged cars as new. Starting in 1983, had BMW adopted a
policy dictating that if a car suffered damage in transport
amounting to less than three percent of its retail value, the car
would be repainted and sold as new. 177 This evidence was
169. Id. at 473-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 484-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 489 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Of additional concern to Justice
O'Connor was the fact that the defendant was a corporation, an entity type
that "jurors may view . . . with great disfavor." Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
173. Id. at 483 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. See infra Part IV.G.
175. See id.
176. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996).
177. Id. at 563. Cars that suffered damage greater than three percent of
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disclosed at trial to a jury.
Gore received $4000 in actual damages.1 78 The jury also
awarded punitive damages to Gore, as there was evidence that
BMW had sold just under 1000 repainted cars under this plan.179
By multiplying Gore's damages ($4000) by the amount of
repainted cars sold (1000), Gore's counsel arrived at four million
dollars as a suggestion for appropriate punishment. 180 The jury
took Gore up on this, awarding Gore precisely four million dollars
in punitive damages. 18 1 This amount was halved on appeal.182
The Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that this was necessary
because BMW could be punished only for conduct that occurred
within the state of Alabama. 183 BMW appealed to the Supreme
Court, and the Court granted certiorari. 184
Justice O'Connor assembled a five-person majority ready to
lead the attack on punitive damages. 8 5 Justice Stevens, who had
approved the massive punitive damages award in TXO, now joined
Justice O'Connor's team and wrote the majority opinion.186 First,
the majority agreed with the Alabama Supreme Court that BMW
Next, the
could not be punished for out of state conduct.'
majority gave teeth to its pronouncement in Haslip and struck
down the punitive damages award as a violation of the Due
Process clause.' 8 8 Given Justice O'Connor's growing discontent
over punitive damage awards, the Court's holding was not entirely
a surprise.
The majority also established three "guideposts" to be
considered in determining the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award: (1) the "degree of reprehensibility" of the conduct
in question; (2) the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages; and (3) the difference between this punitive award and
their retail value were stored by the dealer for a certain amount of time and
then sold as used. Id. at 563-64.
178. Id. at 565.
179. Id. at 565-66.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 565.
182. Id. at 567.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 568.
185.
See id. at 561.
186.
See id.
187. Id. at 572-73.
188. Id. at 574.
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similar penalties. 189 These were, essentially, the guidelines
proposed by TXO's counsel just three years earlier. 190 The first
guidepost is simply a formulation of the traditional "shocks the
conscience" standard of review. The second and third guideposts,
however, represented dramatic shifts in punitive damage
jurisprudence. The second requirement additionally begs the
question: if punitive damages are not meant to make plaintiffs
whole, but rather to deter and punish, why should they have to
bear any relationship to compensatory damages? Even scholar
Clarence Morris, a critic of punitive damages, dismissed this
argument as illogical.19 1
Predictably, the Court found that BMW of America's conduct
was not that reprehensible, the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages (500-to-1) was excessive, and that
Alabama statutory penalties for similar conduct (fraud) were
much smaller than the punitive award.192 The Court was justified
in its conclusion on the first point: passing off a repainted BMW is
dishonest, but is not as morally reprehensible as denying
insurance coverage to an injured person. On the second point, a
500-to-1 ratio is indeed enormous, but the Supreme Court
approved of an even greater ratio just three years earlier in
TXO.1 93 The Court reconciled this discrepancy by focusing on the
potential harm of TXO's conduct rather than the actual harm.
Using this formula, the Court reduced TXO's punitive to actual
damage ratio from 500-to-1 to 10-to-1. 194
Four Justices dissented. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, wrote one of the dissenting opinions and reiterated his
general critique. He criticized the majority's new guideposts,
observing that the guideposts, in fact, offer no guidance at all for

189.

Id. at 574-75.

190. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
191. Morris, supra note 35, at 1181-82 ("[T]he ratio test seems to be an
impediment in many cases, rather than a good legal tool. If it has any effect
at all, it may limit punitive damage awards when they should be severe, and
result in heavy punitive damages when they should be lenient.").
192. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-85.

193.

See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993).

194. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Campbell, noted this sleight of hand
in a footnote. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
430 n.1 (2003).
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reviewing courts. 195 Optimistically hoping that the guideposts
were but a "false alarm," he hoped the guideposts were mere dicta
that would soon disappear from practice.19 6
Justice Scalia's wishes were not borne out in subsequent
cases. In the 2003 case of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance v. Campbell, the Court further limited punitive
damages awards by declaring that "few [punitive damages]
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process."

97

This less-

than-ten-to-one requirement was further narrowed in the 2008
case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, which imposed a one-to-one
ratio for punitive damage awards in admiralty actions.198
Justice O'Connor is now retired from the Court, but the
punitive damages limitation she helped establish lives on. It
grows more restrictive with each case the Supreme Court decides.
Punitive damages awards are now perhaps more arbitrary than
before: if plaintiffs are severely injured, they can receive large
punitive damages, but if they suffer minimal injury, punitive
damages will also be minimal. One is at a loss to explain how this
system effectively allows for the punishment and deterrence of
wrongdoing. It does, however, make sense if one considers the
cultural climate in which the limitation originated, specifically,
the free market environment of the 1970s and 80s. A majority of
the Supreme Court cast aside history, precedent, and the text of
the Constitution in order to render a decision based on prevailing
social concerns.
V. CONCLUSION

Punitive damages were created to hold society's powerful
accountable if they abused their power. In John Wilkes's era, the
Crown was the most powerful institution in England and, in two
notable cases, was punished by angry jurors for a perceived abuse
of power. This was a modest way by which citizens could let the
195.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

196. Id. at 602, 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
198. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008). Although
the Court's holding was technically limited to admiralty actions, it seems
likely that the Court might carry this limitation over to non-admiralty cases
as well.
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Crown know that they disapproved of its actions.
So it is with corporations in twenty-first century America.
Corporations wield immense power and routinely engage in
intentional or grossly negligent acts. Civil actions-and punitive
damages-are one of the few checks citizens have on corporate
malfeasance and arrogance. A recent incident indicates why
America needs punitive damages: the Upper Big Branch South
Mine in West Virginia collapsed in April of 2010 after the federal
government issued over 100 citations and orders related to the
Mine in 2010 alone.199 A third of these were deemed "significant
and substantial."2 00 Additionally, the owner of the mine, Massey
Energy Company, had been fined $1.8 million in governmental
penalties since 2006.201 This is behavior that should enrage the
public, and if the citizens serving as jurors want to say so, they
should be allowed to do so with a fine that will sting.

199.
PUB.

NPR Staff, W. Va. Mine was Recently Cited for Safety Issues,

RADio (Apr. 6, 2010),
story.php?storyld=125647477.
200. Id.
201.

Id.
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